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The activity of the coalition Government between the Five Star Movement (5SM),
the Democratic Party and other centre-left junior allies to tackle COVID-19 has
been praised by some and severely criticized by others. Looking back at this first
year of pandemic, a crucial problem of the Italian management of the disease and
the related economic and social crises has been the lack of loyal cooperation; a
principle entrenched into the Constitution (Art. 120, second para, Const.), with
regard to the relationship amongst the different levels of government. The lack of
sincere cooperation, however, has gone well beyond the (mal)functioning of the
regional state and has also affected the relationship between the Government and
the Parliament, amongst political parties, even within the governmental coalition, and
has ultimately impaired the trust of citizens in the institutions (as further confirmed by
the approval, with an overwhelming majority, of the constitutional reform to reduce
the seats in Parliament from 630 to 400 deputies and from 315 to 200 senators at
the referendum of 20-21 September 2020).
The State of Emergency and the Worsening of the
Legislative-Executive Imbalance
The state of emergency was firstly declared by the Council of Ministers with no
involvement or discussion in Parliament on 31 January 2020 (Art. 24, Legislative
Decree no 1/2018). Since then, upon deliberation of the Council of Ministers, it
has been postponed three times, the last one, so far, on 13 January 2021 and is
expected to last until 30 April 2021 (on the maximum length and the prorogation
of the state of emergency, see here). The state of emergency ensures wide rule-
making powers to the Government, not just within the Council of Ministers – for
example many were the orders adopted by the Minister of Health – but also on its
serving administrative apparatus, like the Department of Civil Protection. Although
the Constitution does not directly regulate the state of emergency, it identifies
specific tools for emergency situations (Art. 77 Const.): Decree-laws are temporary
measures adopted by the Government “in case of necessity and urgency” that lose
their effect retroactively if they are not converted into law by the Parliament within
a 60-days deadline since their publication. Since the initial declaration of the state
of emergency and by the end of 2020 no fewer than 18 decree-laws have been
adopted by the Council of Ministers. While the abuse of decree-laws goes back
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to the 1990s and the Parliament has never hesitated to heavily amend them, their
size, the overall number, and the quick conversion into law, in order to enable the
adoption of further executive measures, have significantly strengthened a trend
toward the marginalization of parliamentary deliberation.
The Government has tried to push parliamentary procedures to the extreme of
limiting the discussion and voting in the plenary and the bicameral nature of the
legislative process, whereas the Chamber of deputies and the Senate enjoy
the same law-making powers and authority in conferring and withdrawing the
confidence to the executive. During the pandemic, the constitutionally disputable
practice of adopting key governmental measures – like decree-laws and budget
bills – through maxi-amendments (amendments composed of one article and
thousands of paragraphs, replacing the entire text of the bill) combined with
questions of confidence triggered by the executive has been systematically used.
As a consequence, the voting of the bills in the plenary article by article, as it should
be, has been inhibited. The severity and urgency of the situation has also compelled
the two Houses to speed up the legislative process consolidating a sort of “hidden”
unicameralism. The House were a decree-law or a bill is first introduced is able to
examine and amend it; the House intervening as the second in the order tends to
pass it as it is in a few days (or hours) with almost no scrutiny.
Protection of Fundamental Rights
Besides the many decree-laws enacted to tackle the health and the economic
emergency, 17 decrees of the President of the Council of Ministers (d.P.C.M.s) and
a plethora of orders by the Minister of Health and by the Head of the Department of
Civil Protection (in addition to all the orders of regional and local authorities) were
adopted last year. This paved the way to an abnormous body of legal instruments
dealing with the pandemic, often repealing or replacing in sequence those that
had been previously adopted. Many of these measures have deeply affected
fundamental rights: to health care, privacy, freedom of assembly, religious freedoms,
free movement, right to education, freedom to conduct a business. Yet, only some
of them are legislative acts or acts having the same rank as legislation, like decree-
laws and legislative decrees, the latter passed by the executive upon delegation by
the Parliament.
There is no unanimous agreement on the ability of such decree-laws and legislative
decrees to fulfil the constitutional requirements set to restrict fundamental rights as
domains reserved to (parliamentary) legislation (see e.g. here). Even more disputed
is the circumstance that d.P.C.M.s and ministerial orders, formally administrative
acts, satisfy this condition. If contested by some (e.g. here and here), others have
pointed out that overall decree-laws can intervene in the domains reserved to
legislation and have been properly used as enabling acts for d.P.C.M.s (e.g. here
and here), thereby remedying and supplementing their legal weakness. Especially
during the first lockdown in Spring 2020 doubts were raised on the sufficient clarity
and precision of the “enabling” decree-laws (in particular, the first one, no. 6/2020)
for the legitimate adoption of the subsequent d.P.C.M.s imposing severe restrictions
on personal freedoms. Moreover, despite their highly sensitive contents, until the
- 2 -
adoption of Decree-Law no. 19/2020 (Art. 2) no involvement of the Parliament
whatsoever was envisaged on d.P.C.M.s and, even later, parliamentary scrutiny
has remained marginal, on measures that had been already pre-packaged by
the executive. Nor constitutional review of legislation can be carried out by the
Constitutional Court on d.P.C.M.s given their nature of administrative acts, if not
indirectly targeting the relevant enabling decree-law.
Till recently the proportionality of the executive measures could not be easily subject
to parliamentary and public scrutiny either, as the ground for their adoption – the
evidence and transcripts of the meetings of the scientific-technical committee, a non-
partisan advisory body of the government composed of experts – was not disclosed.
The publication of the verbatim reports of the scientific-technical committee and the
possibility for the Parliament as well to acquire the information needed from this
committee could signal a renewed collaboration between the legislature and the
executive.
A Regional System Out of Control
The complex functioning of the State-Regions relationship during the pandemic has
been a real test bench for the Italian regional system. From February to April 2020,
after hearing the Presidents of the Regions, the Government adopted incrementally
restrictive measures evenly affecting the entire territory through a national lockdown
although only the North of Italy was hit by the disease. Since the end of October, the
spread of the disease throughout the country has requested a more tailored-made
approach by the Government according to the territorial situation (i.e. the Rt index in
the regions and the regional health care assistance guaranteed).
Regions enjoy shared legislative competences with the State on crucial subject
matters like the protection of health (Art. 117, third para Const.), save for the
basic level of health care assistance under the exclusive competence of the State
(Art. 117 Const., second para, lit. m), and education (Art. 117, third para Const.),
except for the general provisions. During the pandemic this has translated into
even more asymmetric guarantee of these basic rights as soon as the national
restrictive measures were released before the summer. Some regional health care
systems were more under stress than others and the schools, both at primary and
secondary level of education, re-opened with teaching in presence in most Regions
in September, but not in all of them (like Campania and Puglia, upon unilateral
decision of the President of the Region). In theory, the central Government could
step in to enforce exactly the same measures on the whole territory by using its
exclusive competence on international prophylaxis (Art. 117, second para., lit. q),
which appears well fit for a pandemic. Likewise, in compliance with the principles of
subsidiarity and of loyal cooperation, the State could exploit its power to substitute
itself to Regions and municipalities (under Art. 120 Cost.). Such a “centralistic option”
was not the one followed over the last few months.
The Government has used its competence on international prophylaxis and to set
the fundamental principles in matters of health to fix a common regulatory framework
within which the concrete daily administration of the epidemiological emergency
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rests upon the Regions. In any event, according to Decree-Law no. 19/2020 the
Presidents of the Regions were authorized to adopt more restrictive measures
compared to the State under the circumstances foreseen by the same Decree-
Law and when witnessing a serious deterioration of the health care risk in the
Region; such regional orders, also in agreement with the Minister of Health, kept
being applied although, in principle, they would have lost their effects following the
adoption of the next d.P.C.M. (d.P.C.M. 10 April 2020).
This system of “governance” has remained in place even when the d.P.C.M of
3 November 2020 divided for the first time the country into three areas (yellow,
orange and red) depending on the level of epidemiological risk of each Region, every
area having its own corollary of restrictive measures. Within a common regulatory
framework, which for example fixes a national curfew at 10pm, Regions can shift
from one coloured area to another depending on COVID-19 data collected and
transmitted to the central government. The mapping of Italy by area of risk (still in
force, with some revisions), however, has not decreased the tension between State
and Regions, the latter often adopting milder or stricter measures, also depending on
the political convenience.
What’s Next?
The orders of the Presidents of the Regions have repeatedly come under the
review of regional administrative tribunals for departing, without due reasons, from
the national regulatory framework, with more restrictive (see the decision of TAR
Marche no. 56, 27 February 2020) or with looser provisions (see the decision of TAR
Calabria no. 841, 9 May 2020). The derogation from the national rules by Regions
has even been solved in opposite ways by administrative judges within the same
regional territory (see the decree of TAR Puglia, Bari, no. 680 of 6 November 2020
and decree of TAR Puglia, Lecce, no. 695 of 6 November 2020).
Remained at the margin of the political struggle between State and Regions as well
as between the Government and the Parliament, due to the design of the access to
constitutional adjudication, the Italian Constitutional Court has nonetheless ensured
the continuity of its proceedings and recently has been given the opportunity to step
in for the first time on the measures to contrast the pandemic. In the framework
of a constitutional challenge introduced by the national Government against Law
no. 11/2020 of Aosta Valley, one of the five Italian Regions with a special statute,
on 14 January 2021 the Constitutional Court first ordered the suspension of the
effects of the regional law as an urgent matter (order no. 4/2021) and, then, on 24
February 2021 declared unconstitutional the regional legislative provisions violating
State legislation, clarifying that the State exclusive competence on international
prophylaxis grounds the legislative authority of the central level of government in
contrasting the pandemic (compared to other competences, e.g. health protection,
which would have granted a more significant role to Regions). While the judgment
has not yet been published (see the press release), the Court pointed out in the
order that the diversification amongst regions of the response to the pandemic is
not prohibited per se. Yet, it has to occur in compliance with the principle of loyal
cooperation.
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It is precisely this constitutional principle – expressly emphasized also in the last
annual Report by the Italian Constitutional Court’s President – that has been the
most neglected during the pandemic, while the unprecedented emergency the
country is facing would have required a much more genuine collaborative effort
on the part of State and Regions but also in the inter-institutional relationship at
national level between the executive and the Parliament and within the governmental
coalition itself.
With the fifth biggest death toll worldwide and the mass vaccination that is only
starting now, the governmental crisis declared on 26 January, following the
withdrawal of the support by a small coalition partner, Italia Viva, led by the
former President of the Council of Ministers, Matteo Renzi, took many by surprise
and disoriented. One of the reasons put forward for triggering the crisis was
the alleged lack of a “cooperative method” inside the coalition, with a top-down
approach imposed to the allies by Giuseppe Conte with the support of the 5SM.
The appointment of the former ECB President, Mario Draghi, to lead the new
Government, formed by several “technical” Ministers (non-elected eminent experts in
their field) in key positions and by representatives of all major political groups, with a
couple of exceptions, supported by an overwhelming majority in Parliament, is really
the last call for Italy to retrieve a basic level of loyal cooperation and its premise,
the sense of responsibility in the fulfillment of institutional functions, at all levels of
governments and by political actors.
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